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ABSTRACT
The proportion of workers covered by pensions has increasedvery
substantially over the past two or three decades, and in particular the number
of older workers with pensions continues to increase. During thesame period,
and especially in the past decade, the labor force participation of older
workers has declined dramatically. These two trendsrsay well be related. This
paper examines the incentive effects of' private pensions. We find that the pro-
visions of pension plans provide very substantial incentives to terminate work
at the current job after the age of early retirement and even greater incentives
to leave after the age of normal retirement. It is not unusual for the reduc-
tion in pension 'benefit accrual after these retirementages to equal the equiva-
lent of a 30 percent reduction in wage earnings. In addition toa potentially
large impact on labor force participation of older workers, pension plan provi-
sions are likely to have important effects on labor mobility ofyounger workers.
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The proportion of workers covered by pensions has increased very
substantially over the past two or three decades, and in particular the number
of older workers with pensions continues to increase. During the same period,
and especially in the past decade, the labor force participation of older
workers has declined dramatically. The juxtaposition of these two trends
suggests the possibility that they mayberelated. In this paper, we examine
the stipulations of private pension plans with a view to analyzing the incentive
effects created by their provisions. We find that the provisions of pension
plans provide very substantial incentives to terminate work at the current job
after the age of early retirement and even greater incentives to leave after
the age of normal retirement. While analysis of the plan provisions suggests a
potentially large effect of pension plans on labor force participation, the evi-
dence does not directly demonstrate that pension related work incentives did
indeed cause workers to leave the labor force earlier. Such conclusions must
rely on the association of individual retirement decisions with the provisions
of individual pension plans —ananalysis that must await data as yet held from
public use. Nonetheless, examination of the structure of pension plans suggests
the likelihood of a very sizeable effect of plan provisions on labor force par——1—
ticipation. The analysis of plan provisions also allows inferences about the
cost in pension benefits of job change. In addition, the examination of plan
provisions allows consideration of the differential cost of pension plans for
men versus women. The wide diversity of plans and the corresponding wide diver-
sity of the pension related work incentives is a major theme of the Daper.
In an earlier paper Kotlikoff and Wise (i98t) emphasized the apparent
inconsistency of pension accrual profiles with a spot nrket view of the labor
market. The evidence in this paper, particularly the analysis of post normal
retirement benefit accrual and supplemental benefit formulae, provides even
stronger demonstration of the inconsistency. In contrast to the earlier paper
which considered only a limited number of plans with earnings related benefit
formulae, this paper includes the entire universe of defined benefit pension
plans.
I. Background
A. Vested Pension Benefit Accrual Profiles
Information on the value of annual vested accrued pension benefits for
workers of different ages and with different amounts of service is useful for
displaying a variety of pension incentive effects. Vested pension benefit
accrual at age a, 1(a), equals the difference between pension wealth at age
a +1,Pw(a +i),and pension wealth at age a, Pw(a), accumulated to age
a +1at the nominal interest rate r, i.e.:
(1) 1(a) =Pw(a+1)—Pw(a)(1+r).
Pension wealth at age a is defined as the expected value of vested pension
benefits discounted to age a. Intuitively Pw(a) can be thought of as the
worker's pension bank account. If 1(a) equals zero, the worker continuing-2-
employment with the plan sponsor at age a has exactly the same pension wealth at
age a +1as an identically situated worker. who terminates employment at age a.
Pension accrual is thus the increment to pension wealth in excess of the return
on the previously accumulated pension bank account. Throughout the paper we
express pension accrual increments as a fraction of the worker's wage, W(a).
Specifically P(a,t) denotes the ratio of 1(a) to W(a) for a worker age a with t
years of service.
The appendix presents formulae for pension benefit accrual for a very
simple defined benefit pension plan, emphasizing the change in the formula at
ages of full or partial vesting, at early retirement age, and after normal
retirement. This analysis explains why nny pension age—accrual profiles show
sizeable discontinuities at vesting, and early and normal retirement. It is
useful here to provide a brief summary of the implications of these formulae.
The. discontinuities in age accrual profiles associated with vesting are fairly
obvious; in the case of cliff vesting (100 percent vesting occurring at a par-
ticular age) Pw(a) in (1) equals zero prior to the age of vesting and suddenly
becomes positive at the full vesting age. Hence 1(a) is zero prior to cliff
vesting and rises to a positive value at the cliff vesting age, a*; on the other
hand, I(a* +i)is smaller than I(a*) because it represents the difference in
two pension wealth numbers, rather than simply the value of one (Pw(a*)).
Another discontinuity in 1(a) occurs, for nest plans, at early
retirement. This discontinuity occurs for plans that reduce early retirement
benefits using a formula that is less than actuarially fair, and the lower the
reduction the greater the decline in 1(a). To see this note that prior to the
early retirement age Pw(a) is not influenced by the early retirement reduction—3-
rate since workers are assumed to start collecting their vested benefits at the
most lucrative date, which is almost invariably the age of early retirement;
taking benefits at early retirement generally provides a larger present value of
vested pension benefits accrued up to this age than opting to begin collecting
these accrued benefits later. This reflects the use by pension plans of reduc-
tion rates in computing early retirement benefits that are typically lower than
the actuarial rate. While Pw(a) and 1(a) are independent of the reduction rate
prior to early retirement, they are both functions of the reduction factor after
early retirement. The smaller the reduction factor, the closer Pw(a) will be to
w(a +i),holding other factors constant, and the smaller will be 1(a). This
is important since the reduction factors of most plans are fairly small pro-
viding substantially less than an actuarial reduction.
A second, more fundamental reason for smaller increments after the
early retirement age involves discounting. Prior to early retirement an extra
dollar of benefits has a higher present value in the Pw(a +1)formula than in
the Pw(a) formula because at age a +1the worker is one year closer to receipt
of these additional benefits than at age a. After the early retirement age
benefits are available immediately and, ignoring the worker's shortening life
span, an extra dollar of benefits at age a +1has the same present value as an
extra dollar at age a. Stated differently, after early retirement there is no
special advantage from raising benefits next year over this year because, like
additional benefits earned next year, additional benefits earned this year
become available immediately. This lack of discounting after benefits are
available raises Pw(a) relative to Pw(a +1)which implies a smaller annual
pension accrual, 1(a), and smaller values of P(a,t).-4-
A third factor leading to a drop in 1(a) at early retirement is the
shorter life span during which benefits will be collected if retirement from the
Olan is postponed. This factor does not enter into the calculus for 1(a) prior
to early retirement because, conditional on reaching early retirement, both
Pw(a +1)and Pw(a) are based on the same potential lifespan of the worker.
Each of these three factors also plays a role in the significant
decline in 1(a) at normal retirement. Host pension plans do not increase annual
benefits for workers electing to postpone receipt of pensions in years after
normalretirement.This implicit zero reduction rate means a smaller value of
increrental accrued benefits. The second factor involved in the drop in 1(a)
after early retirement is the change in discounting of Pw(a) relative to Pw(a +
i).This feature continues after normal retirement as well because benefits
remain immediately available. Finally, beyond the normal retirement age there
is a more rapid reduction in expected lifespan and, therefore, in the expected
duration of benefit receipt if the worker postpones retiring. This feature also
lowers I(a),(See Appendix).
While these three features help explain low and even negative values of
1(a) after normal retirement, other provisions produce sharp declines in 1(a) at
normal retirement. According to data in the 1979 BLS Level of Benefits Survey
23 percent of covered workers are enrolled in plans that do not credit service
at all after normal retirement. Another 30 percent of covered workers are in
plans that provide limited credit after nomal retirement, and the remaining
pension participants are in plans that credit all service during all years after
normal retirement. Plans that provide limited credit typically credit service
until the worker reaches a specified age, about age 70 on average.—5—
Once plans stop crediting service they either (1) commence benefit
payments immediately regardless of the recipient's work status, (2) defer
pension benefits until the worker actually retires, or (3) defer payment until
retirement, but actuarially increase the benefit. Of the participants in the
plans that provide no or limited credit, 15 percent receive immediate payments,
76 percent receive deferred payments with no actuarial increase, and therest
receive deferred payments with an actuarial increase.
B. implication of Pension Accrual Discontinuities for Viewing Labor
MarketEquilibrium
Ifthe labor market exhibits spot market equilibrium, 1(a) plus the
worker's non—pension compensation at age a, W(a), equals the worker'smarginal
product at age a,
(2) M(a) =W(a)+1(a).
Under the spot market assumption workers always receive M(a) regardless of the
firm or its pension plan. If 1(a) is smaller in one firm that another, W(a)
mustbelarger in the firm with the smaller value of 1(a) to insure equality of
totalannual compensation across firms. Since in a spot market equilibrium
workers can freely move from one firm to another and firms can freely fireany
worker demanding more than M(a), only accrued vested benefits will haveany
economicvalue; if the value of this year's pension benefits reflected anything
other than those to which the worker had legal title, either the worker or the
employer would have an incentive to terminate the employment relationship.
Note that the terms in (i) incorporate the spot market free mobilityassumption
in that workers are assumed to choose the most advantageous date to start
collecting previously accumulated benefits since "retiring" for purposes of—6-
collecting a pension from one firm does not preclude subsequent work in another
firm paying M(a).
Obviously, if W(a) is a smooth function of age, and 1(a) exhibits sharp
discontinuities, M(a) must exhibit sharp discontinuities at these same ages to
satisfy (2). Casual empiricism suggests that W(a) changes smoothly with age, or
at least does not abruptly change precisely at ages when 1(a) exhibits sharp
changes. There is also no reason to believe that M(a) abruptly changes with age
to satisfy (2); hence the sizea'ole discontinuities reported here in the 1(a)
profile appear strikingly at odds with the spot market condition (2).
C. Calculating Vested Benefit Accrual Profiles
This study calculates accrual profiles for 23142 of the 21492 plans
identified by the BLS as useable.2 Throughout the paper we focus on the age
profiles of the ratios of 1(a) to W(a); i.e., we express the pension increments
at age a as a fraction of the wage at age a. We utilize the survey's weights in
presenting various average accrual profiles. The weights reflect the plan's
fraction of total pension participants. To construct accrual profiles for plans
which base their benefits on earnings we used a set of industry— and occupation—
specific cross section age earnings profiles estimated from CPS data.
Longitudinal age earnings profiles were obtained by assuming 6 percent overall
growth in wages and adding to this the wage growth by age estimated by the CPS
cross section data. Kotlikoff and Wise (l981) describe these estimates in
detail. In the analysis here we assume that wage earnings after age 65 remain
constant in nominal dollars.Our actuarial calculations enTploy a 9 percent
nominal interest rate and use a unisex mortality table, which represents an—7-
average of male and female mortality probabilities. Unlike the simple formulae
in the appendix, our calculations take account of the worker's survival probabi-
lities prior to retirement as well as after retirement.
The BLS Level of Benefits Survey contains highly detailed information
concerning the sampled pension plans' vesting provisions, requirements for early
and normal retirement, the specifics of their normal and supplemental benefit
formulae, and the crediting of service and payment of benefits for those working
beyond the normal retirement age.
There is a very considerable amount of diversity in the particular
provisions of private plans which generate sizea'ole differences in vested
pension benefit accrual. Many seemingly minor features of a plan can have very
important effects on benefit accrual. FOr example, consider a stipulation that
service is credited for only 25 years in a plan that permits early retirement at
62. For a worker hired at age 30 the accrual at age 55 will decline sharply to
zero and remain at zero until the early retirement age. Without this ceiling on
credited service, accrual between ages 55 and 62 could be very sizeable; the
weighted average ratio of pension accrual to the wage is roughly 15 percent in
our sample of plans with age 62 early retirement. Other examples of very
important "details" of pension provisions are age and service requirements for
supplemental benefits, ceilings on the amount by which social security benefits
can be used to offset pension benefits, maximum values of pension benefits,
discontinuous changes by age in the rate of benefit reduction for early
retirement, and maximum ages for plan participation. Each of these features, as
well as numerous others not mentioned, can produce sharp discontinuities in 1(a)
at ages other than the ages of vesting, early retirement, and normal retirement.-8-
Our calculatior:s take into account each of the seemingly "minor" as well as
major pension provisions included in the data.
The considerable variation in plan features within industry and
occupation and, consequently, accrual profiles raises several important issues
about the functioning of U.S. labor market. First, equally productive workers
are likely to face very different incentives to change jobs or retire because of
pension plans. Second, the heterogeneity in accrual profiles across plans
suggests that equally productive workers in the same industry and occupation,
but in different plans, may be receiving quite different amounts of total com-
pensation both on an annual and on a lifetime basis. Third, equally productive
workers of different sexes or ages who join the same pension plan in a firm at
the same time are likely to receive very different labor rerrnineration, even if
the quality and quantity of their labor supply is equivalent. Fourth, the
complex calculations required to compute the accrual of vested benefits and,
therefore, the compensation one is currently receiving, calls into question the
understanding of pension compensation both on the part of employers and
workers.
II. Pension Accrual Profiles for Percent of Earnings Plans
Percent of earnings plans are discussed in this section and flat (non
earnings related) plans in the next. Variation in pension accrual profiles by
early and normal retirement ages is discussed first, followed by a discussion of
the wide variation among plans holding early and normal retirement ages fixed.
Next we consider the effect of social security offset provisions and also exa—
mine accrual profiles by industry and by occupation. Then the effects of alter-
native post—normal—retirement provision are discussed. Finally there is an-9-
analysis of the effects on accrual profiles of early and normal retirement
supplements. The cost in pension wealth of Job change is discussed in section
IV. Section V describes the differences in the pension cost of hiring women
versus men.
A.The Decline in Pension Wealth Accrual at Early and Normal
Fetirement Ages
Average accrual profiles for the percent of earnings plans with lO—year
cliff vesting are shown in table 1 by early and normal retirement ages. Three
of these average profiles corresponding to plans with the respective early and
normal retirement ages ——55—55, 55—65, 65—65——are graphed in figure 1. In this
and subsequent figures and tables, annual accrued pension benefits are expressed
as a ratio of the wage. The graph depicts the very substantial declines in the
rate of pension wealth accrual at several critical ages. The first is the age
of normal retirement, which equals the age of early retirement for plans with no
early retirement option. Second, there is also a sharp decline in the rate of
accrual at the age of early retirement, but this decline is substantially lower
than the decline at the normal retirement age.3 Third, there is a very substan-
tial decline between ages 6 and 66 in the average accrual rate no matter what
the ages of early and normal retirement.
The actual declines in average accrual rates at these critical ages
indicated in table 1 are highlighted in table 2. The ages of early and normal
retirement are identical in columns 1, 1, 6, and 8 of the table with respective
retirement ages of 55, 60, 62, and 65. At these ages the accrual rates as a
percent of wages decline from .26 to 0, .27 to —.06, .25 to —.13, and .21 to
—.19 respectively. Thus, at these ages the total annual eonrpensation (wage plus-10-
Tabie 1.Weighted average accruaJ rates for percent of earnings pJans with









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Eary and Norm& Retirement Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
55 55 55 60 60 62 62 65



















—.085—.094 L.044 —.121 •1 —.144 .006 .211
—.292—.169L—.152 —.138—.088—.266—.081 —194
—.297—.184 —.186 —.196—.182 .255—.077—.234
20 8 19 2 20 12 8 40—13-.
pension accrual) from working declines by 21 percent, 26 percent, 30 percent,
and 33 percent respectively. Surely then the incentive to continue work with
the current employer past these ages is very substantially reduced.
In instances where early and normal retirement ages do not coincide,
there is also a very substantial decline in the ratio of pension accrual to the
wage at the age of normal retirement. For example, amongplans with early
retirementat 55 and normal retirement at 60 the decline is from .14 to —.09.
There is also a decline at the age of early retirement for these plans, although
it is considerably less substantial than the decline at the age of normal
retirement. For example, of plans with early retirement at 55 and normal
retirement at 65 the decline at 55 is from .10 to .07, while at 65 the decline
is from •04 to —.15.
Finally, in all cases there is a substantial decline in the rate of
pension accrual between ages 65 and 66. The effective reduction in compensation
ranges from 8 percent to 140 percent of the wage rate except for plans with early
and normal retirement at 60, in which case the decline is from —.12 to —.14.
Thus while the stipulations of plans vary tremendously, these plans, on average,
seem to provide a substantial inducement to retirement after age 65, no matter
what the inducement before this age.
The figure and the table also show a large variation in average pension
accrual at 140, the age of cliff vesting. It is highest, on average, for plans
with early and normal retirement at 55 and lowest, on average, for plans with
early and normal retirement at 65. As mentioned, because the early retirement
reduction is typically less than actuarially fair, pension wealth is generally
greatest if benefits are taken at the age of early retirement. Thus the accrued-14-
weal-t,h at the age of vesting is usually calculated bydiscountingbenefits from
the age of early retirement, assuming that the worker could begin to collect
benefits at that age. Figure 1, for example, shows a vesting spike of almost 25
percent of earnings for 55—55 plans, 7 percent of earnings for 55—65 plans, and
about 14percentof earnings for 65—65 plans.
In summary, it seems apparent that continuation in the labor force
after the age of normal retirement and sometimes early retirement as well
typically involves a substantial reduction in compensation because of the very
large declines in the rate of pension wealth accrual. After the ge of 65,
there is typically a substantial loss in pension accrual, no matter what the
ages of early and normal retirement. And, the sharp changes in average pension
accrual at particular ages provides rather strong prima facia evidence against
annual spot market clearing; neither wages nor marginal products appear to
adjust at these critical ages to meet the spot market equilibrium condition
written in (1).
8. Variation Among Plans
Even among plans with the same early and normal retirement ages there
is wide variation in accrual rates at each age, particularly after the age of
early retirement. To demonstrate this fact, average accrual rates for the 513
plans of table 1 with early retirement at 55 and normal retirement at 65,
together with median, maximum, minimum and upper and lower 5 percentile levels,
are shown in table 3. The lower 5 percentile points for any age group for
example is that accrual rate such that 5 percent of plans have accruals below
that level. The upper 5 percentile point is defined analogously. Consider the
accrual ratio at vesting. While the average vesting ratio for this smaple is—15-
Table3. Dispersion of accruaJ relios for table I p)ens
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.071, the median is .021, the maximum is .383, and the minimum is 0. The ratio
at the lowest 5th percentile is 0, while it i .201 for the largest 5th
percentile. A similarly large dispersion in annual accrual ratios is indicated
for each of the ages 40 through 70. Weighted average accrual rates together
with upper and lower 5 percentile levels are graphed in figure 2. While the
average accrual rates between ages 55 and 6 are positive, for many plans the
rates by 65 are very negative. Thus it is important to base judgements about
the labor force participation incentive effects of pension plans not simply on
the basis of average accrual rates.
Additional evidence of the variability of pension accrued profiles is
obtained by comparing profiles of particular plans. Figure 3 plots the
accrual profiles of four of the sample's 30 largest plans. Plan 1 exhibits a 29
percent vesting spike, a reduction of 30 percentage points in the accrual ratio
at age 55 and a further major reduction at age 65 from —.063 to —.351. In
contrast the vesting spike is only 14 percent for plan 2 in the figure. This
plan also exhibits no major reduction in the accrual ratio at early retirement
and only a minor reduction at normal retirement. Plan 3ts vesting spike is TrLlch
less than that of plan 1, but the drop off of the accrual ratio at age 55 is
very imich larger than that in plan 1. This plan also exhibits extremely sharp
changes in accrual ratios at ages 60, and 63. Plan 14 exhibits even greater
discontinuities in the accrual profile. Thus the plans' incentive effects on
labor force participation also vary widely.
C. The Effect of Social Security Offsets
As described above, a substantial number of.plans have social security





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































depending upon the recipients' social security benefits. The offset provisions
vary widely among plans. In some instances the offset is enough to completely
eliminate payment of pension benefits from the private pension plan. Private
pension benefit payments are typically substantially lower with than without the
offset provision. Accrual rates for percent of earning plans with lO—year cliff
vesting and early retirement at 55 are shown in table 4 for selected normal
retirement ages, with and without social security offset provisions. The
average profiles for offset and non—offset plans with early retirement at 55 and
normal retirement at 62 are graphed in figure 4. A noticeable difference
between the two groups of plans is the relatively large spike at vesting for
plans without the offset compared with the low rate of accrual at vesting for
plans with the social security offset. In addition, the accrual ratio at 55 is
larger for plans without the offset than for plans with it, and the drop in the
rate of accrual is substantially larger for plans without than for plans with
the offset. The accrual ratio for plans without an offset is .21 at 55 and
drops by almost 60 percent to .09 at 56. In contrast, the accrual rate for
plans with an offset is about i6 percent at 55 and drops by only about 26
percent to .12 at age 56. Both groups of plans show negative accrual rates
after the age of normal retirement, 62, and both groups of plans show nuch
larger negative accrual rates after 6. Table 14 indicates that the relative
accrual rates of the two groups for plans with different normal retirement ages
are similar to those shown in the figure.
The table also shows that pension accrual at the age of vesting is
rather substantial for plans without a social security offset even among plans
with normal retirement at 65. The average accrual rate at vesting for all plans—20-
Table4. Weighted averageaccrual ratesfor percent of earnings plans
with 10—year cliff vesting and earlyretirementat age55,by normal
retirementageandsocialsecurityoffset.a
NormalRet. 55 62 65
Offset w/o offsetw offsetw/o offsetw offsetw/o offsetw offset
No. ofPlans 135 17 103 84 254 259
Age
40 .260 .073 .175 .030 .121 .016
41 .049 .005 .034 .010 .022 .004
42 .055 .008 .039 .014 .026 .005
43 .062 .010 .044 .017 .029 .006
44 .071 .013 .049 .020 .033 .007
.uoJ .uI, .UQq .U.F .VJj
46 .090 .030 .064 .027 .041 .011
47 .102 .039 .074 .034 .078 .013
48 .115 .047 .086 .040 .052 .016
49 .130 .061 .100 .049 .058 .019
50 .147 .074 .112 .066 .065 .025
51 .166 .089 .127 .079 .072 .029
52 .187 .108 .143 .096 .081 .041
53 .211 .127 .165 .112 .091 .051
54 .238 .146 .185 .132 .102 .062
55 .269 .175 .213 .155 .116 .076
56 -.008 .042 .090 .115 .078 .058
57 —.016 .036 .092 .120 .077 .065
58 —.025 .040 .103 .135 .076 .076
59 —.034 .034 .096 .140 .073 .082
60 —.043 .025 .087 .143 .069 .091
61 —.052 —.004 .090 .109 .071 .066
62 —.062 —.012 .087 .110 .061 .068
63 —.071 —.024 —.075 —.066 .047 .066
64 —.081 —.026 —.086 —.069 .040 .067
65 —.090 —.032 —.098 —.074 .025 .066
66 —.309 —.109 —.224 —.154 —.203 —.097
67 —.309 —.132 —.248 —.170 —.212 —.108
68 —.308 —.153 —.270 —.184 —.219 —.119
69 —.307 —.172 —.280 —.196 —.227 —.128
70 —.307 —.191 —.290 —.204 —.233 —.136

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































with early retirement at 55 and normal retirement at 65 is .071, as shown in
table 1 above. It can be seen in tablethat that accrual is over 12 percent
for plans without a social security offset while it is less than 2 percent for
plans with a offset.
D. Accrual Ratios by Industry and Occupation
1. Industry
Accrual profiles for selected industries are shown in table 5. For
purposes of comparison and for ease of exposition, profiles are presented only
for plans with early retirement at 55 although profiles for three normal
retirement ages, 55, 62, 65, are shown. The most apparent difference among
industries is in the proportion of plans with particular early and normal
retirement ages. For example, in retail trade and services almost all plans
have normal retirement at 65, with only a few plans with early retirement at 55
or 62. On the other hand, almost 62 percent of plans in transportation have
early and normal retirement at 55, with approximately 20 percent of plans
showing normal retirement at 62 and 20 percent at 65. In manufacturing, 66
percent of plans have normal retirement at 65, 28 percent at 62, and about 6
percent at 55.
But among plans with the same early and normal retirement age, table 5
indicates little difference in average accrual profiles across industries.
Table 6 isolates accrual ratios at critical ages, in particular before and after
the age of early retirement and before and after the age of normal retirement.
Averages are only presented for cells with more than 10 plans. Twodashes
indicate that there were fewer than 10. The cell was left blank if the























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table6. Weighted average accrual rates at selectedagesfor
percent of earnings plans with 10—year cliff vesting earlyretirement

































.091 .168 ——— .086
.158 .228 ——— .250
.100 .078 ——— .141
.101 .087 ——— .044
—.080 —.077 ——— —.093
—.095 —.097 ——— —.108
—.158 —.242 ——— —.187










.056 .122 .080 •077 .068
.087 .127 .056 .146 .098
.067 .091 •034 .092 .082
.068 .058 —.059 .096 .054
—.141 —.206 —.156 —.167 —.144
—.177 —.246 —.162 —.222 —.169—26-
Only in manufacturing and transportation were there a substantial number of
plans with early and normal retirement at 55. In these two industries, the
accrual profiles look very similar. Three industries had a significant number
of plans with early retirement at 55 and normal retirement at 62, and again
there seems to be little noticeable difference among the plans by industry. All
industries have plans with normal retirement at 65.Buteven in this case, the
profiles seem quite similar. The only possible exception seems to be retail
trade, where pension accrual relative to the wage rate is less generous than in
the other industry groups.
Nonetheless, a typical worker apparently faces a much greater incentive
to leave the labor force early in some industries than in others. For example,
a large proportion of workers covered by pensions in transportation would
experience a 27 percent reduction in effective compensation by continuing to
work between 55 and 56. While at 55, pension accrual would be equivalent to
about 27 percent of wage rates for many workers in this industry, if the worker
continued in the labor force until age 66, his annual loss in pension wealth
would be equivalent to 30 percent of wage earnings at 66. A large proportion of
workers in manufacturing have plans with early retirement at 55 and normal
retirement at 65. In this case, the accrual at 55 averages about 9 percent of
the wage at 55 and declines only to about 7 percent of the wage by 65. But then the
accrual rate becomes negative, and if the worker were to continued in the labor
force between 65 and 66, the decline in pension accrual would amount to an
effective reduction in compensation of about 21 percent.
2. Occupation
Among plans with the same early and normal retirement ages, the pension-27-
accrual ratios do not differ noticeably by occupation. Accrual ratios for
professionals, clerical workers, and production workers are shown in table I for
plans with early retirement at age 55 and 3 normal retirement ages——55, 62, and
65. Plans in the 55—65 group are graphed 'byoccupationin figure 5. It seems
clear from the table and the figure that given the age of normal retirement,
there appears to be no substantial differences in accrual ratios by occupational
group. Consider for example plans with normal retirement at age 55: at age
55, the accrual ratio is .29 for professionals, .25 for clerical workers, and
.25 for production workers. At age 66,theaccrual ratio has dropped to —.30
for professionals, —.30 for clerical workers, and —.29 for production workers.
Similarly, close ratios are observed for the other two normal retirement ages.
For example, at age 62 the accrual ratios for plans with normal retirement at 62
are .10 for professionals, .10 for clerical workers, and .10 for production
workers. This is not to say that there are no differences in pension coverage
by occupational groups. It simply says that conditional on having a plan with
given early and normal retirement ages, the accrual ratios for the occupational
groups are very similar. The data in table 7 y, however, be concealing intra
industry variation in accrual profiles by occupation for given retirement ages.
To address this potential ambiguity, accrual ratios for the same plans
treated in table 7 are presented in table 8 but only for manufacturing. But
here again there is very little difference in the accrual profiles by
occupation. Consider, for example, the drop in accrual ratios between age 55
and 66. For plans with normal retirement at age 55, the decline is .58 (.287
minus —.295) for professionals, .51 for clerical workers, and .50 for production
































































































































Tab'e 7. WeTghted everage accrualrates forpercent of earnings plans
with 10—year cliff vesting and earlyretirementat age55,by normal
retiren,ent ageand occupation.a
NormaJ Ret. 55 62 65
Occupation Prof.CJer.Prod.Prof.Cler.Prod.Prof.01cr.Prod.
No. of Plans 53 51 48 75 74 38 204 199 110
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tabe8. WeIghtedaverage accrual ratesforpercent of earnings plans wIth10—year ciTff vestingandearly retTrem&t at age55,by normal
retirement ageand occupation, forrnanufacturlng.a
Normal Ret. 55 62 65
Occupation Prof.Cier.Prod.Prof•Cler.Prod. Prof.Cer.Prod.
No. ofPlans 9 7 6 44 45 18 101 99 56
.082 .081 .108 .064 .059 .050
a. Plans with sarly ornormai retirement supplements are occluded.—31—
workers, and .35 for production workers, respectively, in plans with normal
retirement at 62. Only among plans with normal retirement at age 65 is there a
noticeable difference in the accrual ratios by occupation. In this case, the
drop between age 55 and age 66 is .29 for professionals, .25 for clerical
workers, but somewhat less than .1A for production workers. Thus we conclude
that differences in pension accrual ratios by occupation are primarily due to
different plan types or to differences in early and normal retirement, given the
general type of plan. Production workers, for example, are more likely to have
flat benefit plans than professionals.
E. The Effect of Alternative Post—Normal—Petirernent Provisions on
Pension Accrual
Accrual ratios for percent of earnings plans with early retirement at 55
are shown in table 9 for selected normal retirement ages and for alternative
post—normal retirement provisions. The post—normal retirement provisions have
been grouped into five categories:
(1) Full Credit, Deferred: plans providing full credit according to the
standard formula for years worked past the age of normal retirement,
but with benefits beginning only after retirement.
(2) No Credit, Deferred: plans with no credit given for work after the
the age of normal retirement and with benefits beginning only after
retirement,
(3) No Credit, Immediate Payout or Actuarial Increase: plans with no
credit given for additional work after the age of normal retirement,
but with benefits beginnning irmnediately or increased actuarially




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(14)LimitedCredit, Deferred: plans with limited credit given for work
after the age of normal retiremeht or with full credit for service
post normal retirement up to a specified age or number of years;
benefits are deferred in these plans until retirement.
(5) Limited Credit, Imriediate Payout or Actuarial Increase: plans with
provisions analogous to the third category above 'butwithlimited
credit rather than no credit.
With the exception of plans of type (3), these provisions typically lead to very
negative accrual ratios after the age of normal retirement. Table 9 compares
accrual ratios across these 5 types of plans with varying post normal
retirement benefit porvisions. The table examines alternative normal retirement
ages, with early retirement occurring at 55. The figures in table 9 are
somewhat surprising, indicating quite negative accrual ratios for plans that
fullr credit post normal retirement service; indeed, in certain cases, these
negative accrual ratios are larger in absolute value than negative accrual
ratios of plans that provide no credit.
To isolate the irrrpact of the choice of post retirement provisions,
accrual ratios for percent of earnings plans with early retirement at 55 and
selected normal retirement ages were calculated first assuming that all of the
plans had a full credit provision and second, assuming that all the plans had a
no credit provision. These results are shown in table 10. The table indicates
that the effect of crediting service after normal retirement depends importantly
on the age of normal retirement. For plans with a normal retirement age of 55
negativeaccrual ratios are larger in absolute value under no crediting prior to
age 66andsmaller in absolute value thereafter.—35—
Table10. WeIghted averageaccrualratesforpercent of earningsplans



































































































































































—.285 —.223 —.205 —.212-36-
F. Early and Normal Retirement Supplements
Approximately 11.14 percent of plans have early and 7.5 have normal
retirement supplements. The typical normal retirement supplement provides an
addition to otherwise calculated benefits if the individual postpones retirement
unti], the normal retirement age. The typical early retirement supplement
provides an addition to benefits if retirement occurs after the age of early
retirement. The average accrual rates for percent of earnings and flat plans
with supplements and with 10—year cliff vesting and early and normal retirement
at 55 and 65 respectively, are shown in table 11 'by type of supplement. There
are only two plans in the category with only normal retirement supplements, but
nonetheless the effect of the supplements can be seen in the first column of the
table. The accrual rate jumps from about 9 percent of the wage at age 614 to 60
percent of the wage at age 65 Thus the supplement apparently provides a
relatively strong incentive to remain with the firm until age 65, but thereafter
there is a sharp drop in the accrual rate to —18 percent. Accrual rates for
plans with early retirement supplements are shown in the second column of the
table. In this case there is a sharp increase in the accrual rate from .12 at
age 514 to .1414 at age 55, with a sharp drop thereafter. Again, the provision
seems to provide a substantial incentive to remain with the firm to the age of
early retirement, with a very substantial decline thereafter. Accrual rates for
plans with both types of supplement are shown in the last column of the table.
In this case there is a rather large spike at the age of early retirement, equal
to 62 percent of the wage in that year, with a smaller but still noticeable
spike at about the age of normal retirement.
Accrual rates for percent of earnings and flat plans with either type-37-
Table11. Weighted average accrual ratesforperceit of rn7ngs and flatplanswith 10—year cliffvesting, early andnormal retirement at



























































































































of supplement are shown in table 12 for selected early and normal retirement
ages. The spikes in the accrual rates are highlighted with dashed lines.
Consider for example plans with early retirement at age 55. The spike created
by the early retirement supplement is from .22 to .39 for plans with normal
retirement at 55, from .12 to .50 for plans with normal retirement at 60, and
from .11 to .148 for plans with normal retirement at 65. Of the 56 plans with
normal retirement at age 60, the pension accrual rate at that age is on average
equivalent to 100 percent of the wage rate. Similar discontinuities in the
accrual ratios are evident for plans with other early and normal retirement
ages. For example, of plans with early and normal retirement at age 60, the
accrual rate at that age is equivalent to 614 percent of the annual wage for
persons aged 60. Thus these special supplements create very significant
one—time additions pension wealth and therefore provide potentially very
important incentives to remain with the firm until the age that the special
supplement is awarded. The special supplements also further dramatize the wide
variation in the incentive effects implicit in the provisions of private pension
plans.
III. Flat Benefit Plans
Accrual ratios for flat benefit plans with selected early and normal
retirement are shown in table 13. This table can be compared to table 1 above
which presents comparable numbers for percent of earnings plans. The accrual
profiles for flat plans with early—normal retirement at ages 55—55, 55—60, 55—65
are shown graphically in figure 6. In general, the accrual profiles for the
flat benefit plans look quite similar to those for percent of earnings plans.—39-
Table12. WeIghted averageaccruelrates for percent of earnIngsand flatplans wIth 10—year cliff vestingandearlyornormalretirwant









No. of Plans 19 56 22 37 2 19
Age
40 .199 .136 .082 .078 .068 .056
41 .039 .024 .015 .014 .012 .010
42 .045 •027 .018 .016 .013 .011
43 .052 .030 .021 .018 .015 .013
44 .059 .034 .025 .020 .017 .151
45 .068 .038 .030 .022 .019 .180
46 .077 .043 .036 .023 .022 .020
47 .088 .049 .041 .027 .025 .023
48 .100 .055 .048 .030 .028 .026
49 .114 .062 .056 .035 .032 .030
50 .129 .070 .064 .039 .036 .035
51 .148 .080 •074 .044 .040 .029
52 .167 .090 .087 .050 .046 .033
53 .191 .103 .099 .057 .053 .039
54 .220 .117 .113 .066 .061 •044
55 .389 .498 .484 .075 .069 .060
56 —.019 .071 .016 .086 .080 .064
57 —.078 .071 .019 .099 .092 .161
58 —.048 .071 —.021 .114 .107 .097
59 —.057 .069 —.026 .132 .123 .110
60 —.067 1.079 —.008 .643 .233 .127
61 —.085 —.292 —.049 —.208 .048 .146
62 —.093 —.301 —.056 —.212 .045 .183
63 —.108 —.353 —.067 —.227 .039 —.078
64 —.079 —.079 —.006 —.102 .072 —.086
65 —.086 —.043 .018 —.099 .194 —.094
66 —.124 —.088 —.182 —.100 —.048 —.169
67 —.141 —.116 —.195 —.088 —.064 —.111
68 —.150 —.124 —.191 —.092 —.072 —.112
69 —.151 —.132 —.188 —.097 —.112 —.113
70 —.151 —.141 —.186 —.102 —.120 —.114
a.There era no plans in the 62—65 or In the 65-65 early—normal
retirement groups.-40-
Table13. Weightedaverageaccrual ratesforHatratep(ans with











No. of Plans 3 90 106 10 48 3 17 14
g e
40 .304 .104 .070 .022 .045 .033 .025 .019
41 .052 .027 .012 .004 .008 .006 .004 .006
42 .059 .031 .013 .004 .009 .007 .005 .006
43 .066 .035 .015 .005 .010 .007 .006 .006
44 .075 .039 .017 .005 .012 .008 .007 •007
45 .084 .044 .019 .005 .013 .009 .007 •007
46 .096 ,049 .022 ,007 .015 .010 .008 .007
47 •108 .052 .025 .029 .017 .011 .009 .008
48 .123 .058 .029 .053 .019 .013 .011 .009
49 .139 .064 .032 .063 .022 .015 .012 .009
50 .158 .073 .037 .067 .025 .016 .013 .010
51 .180 .093 .042 .079 .028 .018 .015 .011
52 .205 .105 .048 .084 .032 .021 .017 .012
53 .235 .121 .054 .098 .037 .024 .020 .014
54 .269 .138 .062 .110 .042 .027 .022 .015
55 .308 .163 .073 .150 .048 .030 .025 .017
56 —.121 .079 .052 .171 .055 .035 .028 .018
57 —.119 .077 .055 .189 .063 .040 .032 .020
58 —.118 .095 .058 .228 .073 .045 .037 .030
59 —.117 .105 .060 .258 .084 .052 .043 .036
60 -.117 .105 .061 .285 .101 .059 .050 .042
61 —.263—.029 .050 .005
—
.061 .068 .058 .042
62 —.253—.036 .050—.012 .062 .078 .068 .049
63 —.244—.052 .049—.042 .063—.014 .067 .058
64 —.235—.091 .049—.058 .034—.015 .066 .069


































































































































































































































































































































































































Eecall that we have assumed that the flat benefit increases with the rate of
inflation, assumed to be 6 percent annually in our calculations.
While it. is not possible to make comparisons for plans with each of the early
and normal retirement combinations because of the relatively small sample sizes
in some of them for flat benefit plans, for several early—normal retirement age
combinations, there are rather large numbers of plans of both types, e.g., the
combinations 55—60, 55—65, and 60—65. The average decline in the accrual ratio
between the age of early retirement to age 66 is .30 for percent of earnings
plans versus .39 for flat benefits plans in the case of the 55—60 retirement age
combination. It is .25 versus .16 for the 55—65 combination, and .26 versus .17'
for the 60—65 combination.
Accrual ratios at several critical ages for plans with early retirement
at 55 and normal retirement at 65 are shown below for percent of earnings and
flat benefit plans:







The accrual rates for these plans are graphed in figure 7. The evidence seems
to indicate that the two types of plan provide rather similar .ncentive effects.
The provisions of flat rate plans, like those of percent of' earnings
plans, also yield widely differing ratios, even among plans with the same early































































































































































































































































































































































































among flat plans with early and normal retirement at 55 and 65 respectively are
shown in table l4 and in figure 8. While the average accrual rate at age 55,
for example, is 7 percent, the minimum value is 0 and the maximum 24 percent.
Similarly at age 56, while the average is about 5 percent the maximum is 20
percent and the minimum about 0. At 65, the average is 5 percent, with a
maximum of almost 33 percent and a minimum of about —20 percent. At 66 after
the age of normal retirement, the average accrual rate is —9 percent, while the
minimum is —56 percent and the maximum 0. Thus the incentive for retirement
varies widely among flat, as well as percent of earnings plans.
IV. The Pension Cost of Job Change
There are many ways to think about the effect of job change on pension
accrual and the potential incentive effects of pension provisions on the job
change decision. One approach is to consider the effect of job change on
accrued pension wealth at the age of retirement, say the age of plan normal
retirement. Another way is to consider the expected loss in future pension
wealthfrom changing job as a proportion of expected future wages. We shall
consider variants of both measures.
A. If Change to a No—Pension Job
Considera person who starts a job at some age, say 31. Suppose that
at a given subsequent age the person could change to another job and obtain the
same future wages as on the current job. His decision, assume, is either to
stay on the current job until normal retirement, or to switch to the second job
and stay on that one until the age of normal retirement. But suppose that the-45-
Table14. Dispersion of accrual ratesfortable 11 plans with













106 106 106 106 106 106
Age
40 .070 .073 0 .260 0 .157
41 .012 .013 0 .045 0 •027
42 .013 .015 0 .050 0 .030
43 .015 .016 0 .057 0 .034
44 .017 .018 0 .064 0 .038
.UI •UJ U •OiL U .043
46 .022 .024 0 .081 0 •049
47 .025 .027 0 .091 0 .055
48 .029 .031 0 .102 0 .062
49 .032 .035 0 .115 0 .071
50 .037 .039 0 .130 0 .080
51 .042 .045 0 .147 0 .092
52 .048 .041 0 .166 0 .104
53 .054 .058 0 •187 0 .119
54 .062 ,067 0 .212 0 .137
55 .073 .077 0 .240 .006 .157
56 .052 .053 —.006 .195 0 .123
57 .056 .055 —.007 .192 0 .121
58 .058 .055 —.010 .189 0 .125
59 .060 .055 —.013 .183 —.008 .146
60 .061 .056 —.031 •184 —.024 .173
61 .050 .042 —.217 •204 —.051 .137
62 .050 .040 —.213 .226 —.066 .148
63 .049 .035 —.209 .400 —.082 .162
64 .049 .034 —.204 .561 —.093 .169
65 .049 .029 —.198 .328 —.101 .184
66 —.091 —.067 —.560 0 —.275 0
67 —.093 —.073 —.552 .008 —.291 0
68 —.096 —.079 —.545 .055 —.287 0
69 —.099 —.096 —.536 .045 —.283 0




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































new job has no pension. Then the loss in pension wealth is equal to the pension
wealth that the worker would accrue if he were to stay with the current employer
until the age of normal retirement. This loss relative to the present value of
expected future wages is shown in tables 15, i6, and 17. Table 15 assumes that
an individual begins employment with the first firm at age 31. Table 16 assumes
a starting age of 41, and table 17 a starting age of 51. The tables present
these loss ratios by plan normal retirement age, and loss ratios are calculated
through the age of normal retirement. To obtain a more concise picture of the
losses, they are shown for selected ages of job change in table 18. For plans
withnormal retirement at 65, the loss in pension wealth relative to expected
wages is relatively small, between 4 and 6 percent for all ages of job change,
with the exception of job change at age 59 when joining the firm at age 51. In
the latter case, the remaining working life of the individual is short and he is
not yet vested. Thus the loss in potential pension accrual is relatively large
compared to future earnings.Among plans with earlier normal retirernent——55,
6o, or 62——the potential loss in future pension accrual is considerably larger,
typically on the order of 8 to 20 percent of future earnings. The loss if one
changes jobs just before normal retirement, however, is in some instances much
larger than this, as high as 30 to 50 percent. For example, if at age 31 one
enters a plan with normal retirement at age 60, the loss ratio if one changes
job at 59 is 31 percent. If the individual enters at 51 and leaves at 59, the
loss is almost 50 percent.
The greater relative loss with earlier normal retirement is shown in
figure 9, which presents loss ratios versus age for normal retirement at 55 and
at 65, starting at age 31. The effect of starting age is shown graphically in-48-
Table15. Loss in expectedpensionwealth If change to no—pension job,
as percent of expected wages, by age of job change and by norma?
retirement age, starting initial job at age 31.
Wormal Ret. 55 60 62 65





































.072 .055 •048 .026
.076 .058 .050 .027
.080 .061 .053 .028
.084 .064 .055 .029
.089 .067 .058 .030
.095 .071 .060 .032
.101 .075 .064 .033
.108 .079 •067 .035
.116 .084 .071 .037
.106 .083 .069 .035
.111 .087 .072 .037
.116 .092 .075 .038
.122 •097 .078 .040
.128 .103 .081 .041
.134 .108 .083 .043
.140 .115 .086 .044
.145 .121 .089 •046
.151 .128 .092 .047
.156 .135 .094 .048
.161 ,143 .095 •049
.163 .152 .097 .050
.163 .161 .097 .050
.154 .171 .096 .050











Table16. Loss in expectedpensionwealth If change to no—pension job,
aspercent of expected wages, by age of Job change and bynormal
retirementage, starting initial job at age 41.
Normal Ret. 55 60 62 65
No. of Plans 57 349 546 1009
Age
41 .079 .064 .062 .034
42 .086 .068 .065 .036
43 .093 .073 .071 .038
44 .103 •079 .076 .040
45 .114 .085 .082 .043
46 .127 .092 .088 .046
47 .143 .101 .096 .050
48 .164 .111 .104 .054
49 .191 .122 .114 .058
50 .117 .096 .097 .048
51 .121 .100 .102 .049
52 .122 .103 .106 .051
53 .119 .106 .110 .052
54 .103 .108 .115 .053
55 .104 .111 .052
56 .105 .106 .053
57 .105 .111 .053
58 .100 .119 .052







Table17. Loss Inexpected pension wealthIf change to no—pensIon job,
as percent of expected wages, by age of job change end by normal
retirement age, starting Initial job at age 51.
Normal Ret. 55 60 62 65
No. of Plans 32 178 451 1287
Age
51 .000 .080 .094 .046
52 .000 .091 .105 .051
53 .000 .104 .118 .056
54 .000 .122 .134 .062
55 .146 .150 .069
56 .178 .169 .079
57 .229 .203 .090
58 .313 .251 .104









































































































































































































































































































































figure 10 for plans withnormal retirementat 60.
A limiting case of numbers like those presented in table 18 is the
present discounted value of expected pension benefits at the age of hire as a
proportion of expected wages at that time. These numbers of course indicate the
cost to the employer of pension benefits versus wages if a person stays with the
employer from the time of hire to the age of early or normal retirement. Such
ratios are presented in table 19 by age of initial employment and plan normal
retirement age. The ratios are presented first assuming that the individual
remains with the firm until the age of early retirement and then assuming that
the person remains until the age of normal retirement. It can he seen from the
table that the present discounted value of pension versus wage compensation is
small on average, ranging from about 2 percent to about 10 percent. The average
proportion of compensation in pension benefits is typically larger the later the
age of initial employment. For example, the ratio of pension benefits to wages
for plans with normal retirement at 62 is .0149 if one enters the firm at 31 and
stays to the age of normal retirement. The ratio is .062 if one enters at 141,
and .0914 if one enters at 51. It is important to understand that while these
ratios may appear relatively small, the pattern of pension accrual may still
have a very substantial effect on worker labor force participation, as
demonstrated above.
And, possibly the most striking feature of these loss ratios, is the
wide variation among plans. To demonstrate the dispersion, the mean loss ratio
together with the minimum and maximum at each age, are shown in table 20 for
plans with normal retirement at 65 and for persons who enter the firm at age 31.











































































































































































































































































































Table18. Loss in expected pension wealth if change to
no—pension job, as percent of expected wages by age





55 60 62 65
31:
44 .13 .10 .08 .04
49 .16 •14 .09 .05
54 .12 .18 •09 .05
59 —— .31 .06 •04
41:
44 .10 .08 .08 .04
49 .19 .12 .11 .06
54 .10 .11 .15 .05
59 —— .09 .13 .05
51:
44 —— —— —— ——
49 —— —— —— —-
54 —— .12 .13 .06
59 — •48 .33 .12
a, With expectations evaluated to plan normal retirement age.—55—
Table19. Present discounted value of expected pension benefits
as a proportion of expected wages, at age of hire,
by age of hire and plan norrn& retirement age.























































56 .043 —.181 .289
57 .042 —.178 .301
58 .040 —.175 .313
59 .037 —.187 .325
60 .032 —.229 .335
61 .030 —.221 .341
62 .026 —.233 .339
63 .023 —.248 .321
64 .016 —.220 .367
65
Table 20. Disperslon of
no—pension job, for plans
-56-
lossin pected pension wealth if change to
in table 15 with normal retirement at age 65.


























of plans——the loss is close to zero for some plans and indeed is even negative
for some. For other plans, however, the loss is very high, ranging up to 26
percent of future earnings at age 5)4 After 55, the maximum loss is typically
over 30 percent, while the minimum is close to —20 percent at each age. Pension
accrual after the age of early retirement is negative in many instances. For a
member of such a plan, it would pay to leave this firm, taking early retirement
benefits, and join another firm, assuming that one could join the second firm
and obtain the same expected future wages.
B. annd Pension Wealth at Age of Normal Betirenient
Pension wealth at the age of normal retirement may be reduced very
substantially by job change, as shown in Table 21.A person who began work at
31 and changed to another job at l would have accrued, on average, only 72
percent of the pension wealth of a person who began at 31 and remained in the
same firm. If he changed jobs at 4l and again at 51, he would accrue only 43
percent of the pension wealth of a person with no job change. This percent
ranges from a low of 30 on average in transportation to 60 percent in
construction. Thus the loss in pension wealth with job change seems to provide a
potentially large incentive against job mobility.
Because some plans place a limit on years of service that are credited
in calculating benefits, it may in some instances pay to change jobs and begin
to accrue benefits in a new plan. This leads to ratios that are greater than
one in a few instances. The minimum and maximum values, over all industries
arise in anomalous plans, and these should not be given much weight; but they do
suggest that there is substantial variation among plans in this respect, as well
as in other respects discussed above.-58-
Table 2): Weighted average pension wealth (or ratio) at normal
retirement, by ageofInitial employment, end by job change,




















All industries 2342 32491 21410 10°24 .72 .85 .43
Mlnlmum 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 197070 175899 1)7291 4.97 8.18 5.09
Mnlng 39 44856 27237 13147 .62 .81 .38
Construction 9 35778 28680 16837 .87 1.02 .60
Manufacturing 1297 31448 20393 10633 .73 .85 .44
Transportation 328 38680 22350 8598 .57 .81 .30
Wholesale trade 100 30836 21989 13135 .74 .87 .50
Retail trade 260 19453 13002 6024 .67 .80 .41
Finance 7 38864 30766 17309 .91 1.01 .58
Services 8 29993 22551 12520 .77 .87 .47C. Pension Accrual Ratios and Age of Initial Employment
Pension accrual rates for percent of earnings plans with 10—year cliff
vesting are shown in tables 22 and 23 for persons beginning employment at ages
1i and 51 respectively. The tables are analogous to table 1 above, presenting
information by plan early and normal retirement ages. To provide an easier
comparison of the accrual rates by starting age, accrual rates for selected ages
are shown in table 2. The numbers are taken from table 1, table 22, and table
23. Accrual ratios for plans with early and normal retirement at 55and65
respectivelyare graphed in figure11.The accrual rate at vesting is the most
important difference across initial employment ages. For example, as shown in
table 24, the accrual rate at vesting is for persons beginning employment at
31, it is .62 for those beginning at age )41, and .92 for those beginning at age
51. The difference is simply due to the fact that the later the age of initial
employment, the nearer is the time of benefit receipt at the age of vesting.
The accrual rate at vesting increases with age of initial employment for each
early—normal retirement age category. Otherwise, the pattern of accrual rates
does not vary by starting age, except that the absolute value of the rates, both
positive and negative, is smaller as the age of initial employment increases.
Again, this is simply because potential benefits are lower with later starting
ages and, thus, potential losses after the age of early or normal retirement are
smaller. Notice that the accrual rate after the age of 6isnegative in each
case. Plan provisions typically make the age of early and normal retirement
dependent upon age and years of service. Thus in practice, the ages of early
and normal retirement are typically somewhat higher for persons beginning
employment at age 51. But inno case is the age of normal retirement greater-60-
Table 22. Weighted average accrualrates forpercent of earnings
plans with 10—year cliff vesting, by earlyandnormal

















No. of Plans 38 63 576 169 86 27 10 56
Age
50 .618 .347 .209 .349 .127 .017 .135 .126
51 .106 .066 .040 .065 .026 .051 .021 .029
52 .123 .082 .046 .075 .029 .059 .024 .033
53 .141 .095 .052 .085 .035 .068 .027 .038
54 .160 .109 .060 .098 .041 .083 .030 .044
55 .184 .125 .070 .112 .047 .095 .034 .052
56 .006 .094 .069 .128 .055 .101 .037 .061
57 .002 .099 .065 .146 .064 .118 .042 .070
58 .0003.107 .068 .167 .077 .137 .047 .085
























































a. Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are cciuded.-60a-
Table23. WeIghted averageaccrualrates for percent of earnings
plans wIth 10—year cliff vesting, by early and normal











No. of Plans 23 23 143 60 419 52 11 425
Age





.001 .0002 .000 .004 0 .000
57 .000 0 .001 .0002 .000 .004 0 .000
58 •000 0 .001 .0002 .000 .003 0 .000
59 .000 0 .001 .0002.000 .003 0 .000
60 .923 .774 .6131.040 .451 •644 .541 .449
61 .041 .033 .081 .034 .056 .132 .091 .084
62 .036 .029 .081 .028 .059 .169 .103 .098
63 .028 .023 .082 .021 .063 .047
-
.077 .112
64 .022 .018 •084 .015 .065 .039 .079 .126






a Plans with early or normal retirementsupplements are excluded.—61—
Table 24. Pensionaccrual rates for percent of earnings plans with
10—yearcliff vesting, by early and normal retirement age and
by age of Initial employment, for selected ages
Early—Normal Retirement














































































0 0 0 0 0
.62 .35 .21.35 .13
.18 .13 .07.11 .05
—.01 .12 .07.21. .10
—.02 —.00 .07—.02 .08
—.04 —.02 .07—.04 .08
—.12 —.12 —.11—.19 —.06
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































V.Pension Accrual Rates and Pension Cost by Sex
Because women on average live longer than men, women would typically
receive pension benefits longer than otherwise equivalent men. The effect of
this difference in life expectancy on pension accrual and the value of pension
benefits is considered in this section. The weighted average of the accrued
benefits of women versus the accrued benefits of men by age are shown in table
25 for all plans in the sample. At the most common vesting age, 10 years, the
ratio is about 1.08 so that women's vested benefits are approximately 8 percent
higher than mens. The ratio increases gradually to abuut 1.10 at age 60 and
about 1.13 at 65. If otherwise identical men and women were to work until age
TO, the average ratio would be 1.17. The ratios do not vary significantly by
early and normal retirement age, and thus a breakdown by plan type is not
presented.
VI. Summary
The ratios of pension benefit accrual to wage earnings are presented
for a wide range of pension plans. Typical plan provisions provide a strong
incentive for retirement after the age of plan normal retirement, and several
plan types provide a strong incentive for retirement after the age of early
retirement. A striking feature of the incentive effects of pension plans is
their wide variation among plans. For example, while the average plan may
provide reduced but still positive accrual after the age of early retirement,
for a large proportion of plans the accrual rate after this age is very
negative. Thus it would not be unusual for the reduction in pension benefit-61-
Table25. The ratio of accrued pension benefits of womenvs.men,
by age, aH piansa
Age Ratio Age Ratio
31 1 51 1.109
32 1 52 1.106
33 1 53 1.103
34 1 54 1.099
35 1.032 55 1.094
36 1.030 56 1.096
37 1,032 57 1,098
38 1.037 58 1.101
39 1.036 59 1.103
40 1.082 60 1.102
41 1.083 61 1.108
42 1.085 62 1.113
43 1.087 63 1.120
44 1.089 64 1.126
45 1.091 65 1.131
46 1.094 66 1.138
47 1.096 67 1.145
48 1.099 68 1.153
49 1.102 69 1.161
50 1.105 70 1.170
a. There are 2342 plans. Starting age Is 31.—65-
accrual after the age of early retirement to be equivalent to a 30 percent
reduction in wage earnings. The accrual rate at the age of vesting can range
from as low as 2 percent of wage earnings in that year to as high as 100 percent
of wage earnings, depending upon the plan type and on the age of initial
employment. Thus for some employees, vesting could be a very important
determinant of labor force participation decisions. Special early and normal
retirement provisions may also add very substantially to accrued pension wealth
at particular ages and may thus encourage workers to remain with a firm until
these benefits are received. The accrual profiles under flat benefit plans seem
very similar to the accruals under percent of earnings plans, if one assumes
that the flat benefit is increased to keep pace with the rate of inflation.
Given early and normal retirement ages, there is little difference in plan
accrual profiles by industry or by occupation. Differences in pension benefits
by industry depend more on the type of plan than on variations among plans with
the same basic provisions. While the expected loss in pension benefits due to
job change is apparently relatively small in many instances, it is rather large
in others, and there is very wide variation among plans with the loss very high
in some cases and, indeed, in other cases a gain may be had by changing job. In
addition, accrued benefits at the age of retirement are typically very much
lower with job change than if a person remains on the same job. Because women
typically live longer than men, accrued pension benefits at any age are higher
for women than for men, about 13 percent on average at age 65, for example. In
short, the evidence suggests that the rapid increase in pension plan coverage
over the past two or three decades may well have contributed very substantially
to the reduction in the labor force participation of older workers during this
period. The plans may also have an important effect on labor mobility.-66-
FOOTNOTES
1.Gary Heaton accomplished the very substantial programing task that the
paper required and served as a continuous source of information, explanation,
and expertise. We thank Tom Gustafson for his very helpful comments.
2. Only plans with incoiplete or inconsistent information were classified by
the BLS as unusable.
3. Our calculations ignore service requirements for early retirement, since
this inclusion could have considerably complicated our accrual computations.
Excluding early retirement service requirements from the analysis is not likely
to significantly alter the results. Virtually all workers covered by such
requirements are enrolled in plans with early retirement service requirements of
15 years or less. (Kotlikoff and Smith, 1983).—67—
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The source of discontinuities in age accrual profiles is clarified by
considering a simple earnings—related defined benefit plan with "cliff vesting"
at 10 years of service. Vested accrued benefits are clearly zero prior to the
age at which the worker has ten years of credited service in the plan. Let
E(a,t) denote the ratio of 1(a) to W(a) for a worker age a with t years of
tenure, where 1(a) is defined in (i) in the text. Then R(a,t) is zero for t9.
If a person age a with 9 years of service works an additional year, the ratio of
the increment to the wage, W(a), is
10 (55 -(a+i)
(Al) R(a,9)
B(a,t)A(55) (1 +d (1 +
W(a)
In (Al), B(a,t) is the retirement benefit available to the worker who terminates
employment with the plan sponsor at age a after t years of service, but who
delays receipt of pension benefits until the plan's normal retirement age. The
normal and early retirement ages assumed for this stylized plan are 65 and 55
respectively. Terminating workers in this example are eligible for early
retirement benefits. Our hypothetical plan reduces benefits by d percent for
each year that early retirement preceeds normal retirement. The benefit
reduction rate, d is assumed to be less than the actuarial fair rate.
The function A(55) is the actuarial discount factor that transforms
benef it flows initiating at age 55 into expected stocks of pension wealth at age
55. Expectations here are taken with respect to longevity. Thus A(55) is the
annuity value of a dollarts worth of pension benefits to be received each year
until death, beginning at age 55. For simplicity asume that the probability of
dying prior to age 55 is zero. Hence the present value at age a of A(55) is—2—
A(a) =A(55)(1 +rH
—a)for a55. If pension benefits are determined as
a constant X times the product of final year's earnings and service, and there
is no offset for receipt of social security benefits, B(a,t) is simply:
(A2) B(a,t) =XW(a)t,and
(A3) R(a,9) =X(i+d)°(i +
-(a+1))
A(s5)1oW(a±l)
P(a,t), for t increasing pari—passus with age, is zero prior to t
equals 9 and jumps at t equals 9 to the value given in (A3). Cliff vesting thus
produces spikes in the accrual profile such as that in Figure 1 at 10 years of
service. Between the age at cliff vesting and age 55 pension wealth, Pw(a), is
given by:
—10 —(55 —a)
(Au) Pw(a) =XW(a)(l+d) (1 +r) A(55)t,




Equations (A3) and (AS) suggest a drop in F(a,t) as a increases to a +1con-
current with an increase in t from 9 to 10. Equation (AS) will be positive if
the bracketed term exceeds zero. This will be the case if the percentage
increase in the wage plus the percentage increase in years employed (l/t) is
greater than zero. Assuming the term in brackets is positive and is roughly
constant, B(a,t) will increase exponentially due to the exponential decline in
the discount factor, (1 +
—(a+ asa approaches 55.
If the value of d is considerably less than actuarially fair, a
discontinuity in B(a,t) occurs at the early retirement age, 55. At ages 55
and 6 we have:—3—
(A6) Pw(55)= Aw(55)(l+dY°A(55)t, and
(A') Pw(56) =Aw(56)(1+a)9A(56)(t +1).
Hence,
[w(56) t+ 1A(56) (1 +a)
(A8) R(55,t) =A(i+a) (i +r)A(55)tL55 tA(55)(1 +rT
-1
Assuming wage growth at 54isclose to that at 55 and A(56) approxi-
mately equals A(55), then R(55,t) primarily differsfromR(51t,t —1)because
the first terms in the bracket in (7) is now railtiplied by(1 + a)while the
second term, —1, is multiplied by (i +r).Since r exceeds d byassumption,
R(55,t) can easily be less than R(5)4,t —i). Indeed, this change in the func-
tional form of R(a,t) can produce sharp drops in accrual rates at the early
retirement age for a host of pension plans and a range of realistic economic
assumptions.
It is important to realize that the early retirement reduction, lower
wages, and one less year of tenure yield lower benefits at 55 than at 56.The
early retirement reduction reduces benefits at the rate d. But if benefits
were taken at 55 they could accrue interest at the rate r. Thus by foregoing
the early retirement option of receiving benefits at 55, a cost is incurred
that depends on the difference r —d.If this loss is not offset by the
increase due to wage growth and 1 year of additional tenure, there will be a
drop in the benefit accrual rate between 55 and 56.
The same considerations pertain to benefit increments between 56 and
6. Recall that we have assumed a less than fair early retirement reductionso that benefits accrued before 55arevalued based on the assumption that bene-
fits are received starting at the age that yields maximumpensionwealth. The
optimum time to receive benefits accrued between 55 and 56 is 56, between 56 and
57 is 51,andso forth. But to gain benefits from working another year, it is
necessary to forego the option of immediately taking acrued benefits at an
advantageous reduction rate.
Between ages 6 and 65, R(a,t) equals:
—(65— a) W(a +i)(t +i)A(a +i)(1 +d)
(A9) B(a,t) +X(i+d) (1 +r)A(a)tJytCT(1+r)
—
Incontrast to the H(a,t) formula in (A5) that applies to the period between
cliff vesting and early retirement, (A9) indicates that the actuarial reduction
factor d, rather than the interest rate r, imparts an upward tilt in the P(a,t)
profile between early and normal retirement, as long as the term in brackets is
positive. In (A9) as in (A5) and (A8) the accrual rate, B(a,t), is an
increasing function of the rate of nominal wage growth. Larger nominal interest
rates reduce acrual rates at all ages, with a negative interaction with age
prior to early retirement.
While the expression (AS) is unlikely to be negative, large differences bet-
ween wage growth and the interest rate r can yield negative increments in pension
wealth after the early retirement age. To a first approximation, the bracketed term
in equation (A9) will be positive if AW/W +lit> r —d,where W/W is the per-
centage increase in wages, and l/t is the percentage increase in tenure. It is
easy to see, however, that low wage growth and high interest rates will yield
negative increments.—5—
Pension accrual after normal retirement can be significantly negative.
Assume that our hypothetical plan neither credits service after normal retirement nor
provides an actuarial increase in benefits for postponing benefit receipt beyond the
normal retirement age. In this case R(a,t) after normal retirement is given by:
(Ala) R(a,t) =Xt*A(a) IA(a
+1)—(1 +r)l
LA(a) j
Wheret equals the worker's service prior to age 65. Note that for the following
reasonable parameter values:
=.02,t =30,A(a) =15,r =.04,andA(a +1)l4, R(a,t) = —.96,
a quite substantial negative accrual ratio.
While the preceeding formulae are suggestive of the general shape of accrual
rate profiles, there are few earnings—based plans with features as simple as the one
considered here. In addition to more complicated rules for plan participation and
vesting that often involve age as well as service requirements, there are a variety
of methods of computing earnings bases, including career averages, and averages of
earnings, possibly highest earnings, over a specified period or number of years.
eduction rates for early retirement are often a specified function of age, if
not length of service. Some plans allow no further accrual after a given number of
years of service. Roughly thirty percent of defined benefit participants belong
to plans that are integrated with social security, and the form of "integration"
can have an important effect on the pattern of benefit accrual. Other plans, in
particular, those with social security offset formulae, provide supplemental
benefits for early retirees prior to their receipt of social security benefits.
In addition to theseearnings—related plans, a significant number of plans-6-
covering over forty percent of defined benefit participants calculate benefits
independent of the participant's earnings. Finally, there are plans that spe-
cify iinimun and nEximu benefit levels.